What does it mean to be unconservative? The question has acquired a new relevance as Tories tussle over the direction of Boris Johnson’s government.
David Canzini, Johnson’s new campaign strategist and deputy chief of staff, deploys the term as a reason for ditching policies while ministers cited it as an argument against a windfall tax on energy firms. To many on the right, conservatism is clear. It means a presumption in favour of lower taxes, a smaller state, personal freedom, private enterprise and patriotism.
But the key word here is presumption. A defining facet of conservatism is that it is an attitude not an ideology. It resists grand visions and dialectics. This is best captured by Michael Oakeshott’s majestic depiction of political activity as sailing “a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting place nor appointed destination”. The craft is using one’s experience “to make a friend of every hostile occasion”.
For decades conservatives subscribed to this. They had ideas and instincts but these were tempered by pragmatism. This changed after Margaret Thatcher, when her disciples turned her calibrated instincts into dogma.
The question has been revived by two vacuums — the first created by Johnson’s lack of ideological or economic clarity and the second by the prospect of a leadership contest. Ideologically, Johnson travels light. While he adheres to the low tax agenda, his temperament is interventionist. Set aside Brexit and he is a pragmatic, or opportunistic, leader. If there is such a thing as Johnsonism, it comes without a manual.
The desire for political purity is more keenly felt because the pandemic forced the government into unwelcome actions, hiking taxes, paying people’s wages and restricting freedom. Battling to survive, Johnson is keen to pacify his rebellious right wing. Hence Canzini is blocking policies deemed insufficiently blue. The upshot is that the definition of conservatism is devolved to a campaign strategist more focused on product differentiation than good government.
But what exactly is an unconservative policy? What, for example, is unconservative about a windfall tax on energy companies but not about a six percentage point increase in corporation tax?
Are tax rises less conservative than excessive borrowing? If it is conservative to believe in free trade, is it not unconservative to throttle it back in your largest market?
Is the conservative stance to act to stimulate economic growth with targeted investment in the science or skills, or to cut taxes and get out of the way?
What is a conservative level of public spending? Is it unconservative to pay the salary of millions of private sector staff during a pandemic or safeguard the poorest from high inflation? Is regulation always unconservative or is it justified to act against market failure in, say, the audit business?
The point, obviously, is that conservatism depends on context. Raising tax may be undesirable but if the alternative is worse, it is not unconservative.
But such talk is a symptom of the party’s identity crisis. As recently as David Cameron’s government, their outlook was clear. British conservatism was a dash for growth, it was a small state, low taxes, globalisation and a values-blind welcome to inward investment. If borrowing got too high, you cut spending. You doubled down on the places and sectors that thrived.
This was the compass by which Tories steered and for which many MPs (even the Brexiters) still hanker. But events have altered that course. The world has changed; trade barriers are rising; self-reliance is a new creed. The electorally shrewd appeal to working class voters means no longer shrugging over globalisation’s losers. The Tories are also reliant on older voters with fixed incomes who are more dependent on public services. Thatcher’s children are now Johnson’s grandparents.
But Brexit, followed by the shocks of the pandemic and Ukraine, has damped prospects for the growth that will fund it. There is no underpinning economic strategy as there was with Cameron. So Tories must choose between higher taxes, increased borrowing or reduced spending. But for many — Johnson included — austerity is no longer an option and, post-pandemic, voters have been re-educated to look to the state for solutions.
This is the conservative fear, that they are losing the ideological battle that sustains them in power. But it is more of a problem for an ideologue than a pragmatist. It was Disraeli who described a sound conservative government as “Tory men and Whig measures”.
The danger for Tories and the country is that, with Johnson’s future in doubt, would-be successors will want to show they offer a return to true principles.
The secret of British conservatism is its capacity for reinvention. Since the founding leader, Robert Peel, conservatives have accepted policies they dislike for the wider public good. They grasp that exceptional times can demand exceptional action. A policy choice can be a mistake but purity is the real unconservatism. (One might also note the attacks on UK institutions and the weakening of checks and balances).
The unconservative course is the one which pays no heed to circumstance. The goal can remain a smaller state or low taxes but a conservative ship adapts to the conditions rather than imagining it can abolish the weather.
